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Special Education: You Can Use the System to Get 
Services for Qualified Abused and Neglected Children 
Part I of a 2-part series 
What is Special Education? Where children with 
disabilities are placed in a special classroom or school? If 
you think of special education in that way, you are both right 
and wrong. That is not what the law calls for but it is the way 
the system is sometimes used. 
The United States Congress recently reauthorized the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) with 
Amendments of 1997, P.L. 105-17. This article explains the 
law's requirements for children with disabilities, highlighting 
some of the changes.' IDEA, which applies to students from 
birth to twenty-one, requires that children with disabilities be 
provided with a "free appropriate public education" (F APE) 
in the "least restrictive environment" (LRE) that meets the 
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1 Some children with disabilities receive services through Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, rather than through the IDEA. These children generally fall into two 
categories: (I) they have a physical disability such as diabetes which does 
not affect their ability to learn but may require modifications such as 
extra snacks or (2) they have attention deficit disorder which does not 
reach the level of severity of the IDEA but does require curriculum or 
classroom modifications. The procedures for implementing the acts are 
essentially identical , although some terminology and aspects of the 
discipline process are different. 
students' unique needs and prepares them for employment and 
independent living. Under IDEA, "child with disability" 
means a child with mental retardation; hearing, speech or 
language, visual, or orthopedic impairment; serious 
emotional disturbance; autism; traumatic brain injury; other 
health impairment; or specific learning disabilities. IDEA 
places an affirmative duty on local educational authorities 
(LEAs) to identify students who need special education and 
related services. 
A "free appropriate public education" means an 
individually designed special education program and related 
services. Related services are supportive services such as 
transportation, occupational and physical therapy, counseling, 
parent training, recreation, social work services, speech and 
language therapy, and school health services (a new related 
service is orientation and mobility services) that assist the 
student in benefiting from special education services. 
The special education process is begun when anyone 
with an interest in the child requests that the school assess the 
child to determine if the child has a disability. This request 
can come from the parents, a teacher, the child's social 
worker or guardian ad litem. lt is essential to make this 
request in writing. State Department of Education policies 
allow 45 days to complete the evaluation from the date of the 
request. Persons seeking an evaluation should not agree to 
defer it until completion of any type of informal process that 
the school might offer. The parents must be notified that the 
school wants to assess the child and what type of assessment 
will be done. The parents must agree to the assessment and 
to each of the tests which are to be included in the 
assessment. Generally, biological parents of children in 
foster care retain the ability to consent to the child's 
educational plan unless the court specifically denies the 
parents' educational rights . 
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For students whose parents are unknown or 
unavailable, whether or not the child is in foster care, the 
school must appoint a surrogate parent, a person who will act 
as the parent in educational matters regarding the student. 
This cannot be a school or DSS employee. A guardian ad 
litem, an adult relative of the child, or a foster parent can be 
appointed as the surrogate parent for special education 
purposes if they are knowledgeable about the child and the 
child's rights. The child can be reevaluated if a member of 
the team requests it and must be reevaluated at least every 
three years. The parent or surrogate parent must agree to the 
tests which will be included in the reevaluation. Parents, 
guardians, or surrogate parents have the right to obtain 
independent evaluations at their own expense and have the 
right to seek an independent evaluation of the student at 
public expense. They will be reimbursed if the independent 
evaluation provides additional or different information than 
the original evaluation and that information is accepted in any 
forum (by the school district, in mediation or by any hearing 
officer). 
You should also be aware that IDEA requires that 
the State develop and implement a statewide, comprehensive 
system of early intervention services for infants and toddlers 
with disabilities and their families. South Carolina's early 
intervention program, called Baby Net, is administered by the 
Department of Health and Environmental Control. Each 
family of such an infant or toddler should have an 
Individualized Family Service Plan which is reviewed at least 
annually. IDEA also requires that school districts make a free 
appropriate public education available to children with 
disabilities aged 3 through 5. BabyNet must start planning 
for the transition into public school at least six months before 
the child's third birthday. 
The blueprint for the student's special education is 
the Individualized Education Program (IEP). The key word 
here is individualized. The IEP is put together by the IEP 
team, which includes the parents or surrogate parent of a child 
with a disability (their rights are transferred to a competent 
child who turns 18), a regular education teacher (a new 
requirement effective July 1, 1998), a special education 
teacher, a representative of the local education agency who 
has authority to agree to services, an individual who can 
interpret the evaluation results, and other people requested by 
the parents or agency. 
The IEP should start with a review of the child's 
present levels of educational performance including the 
child's strengths and areas of improvement and parents' areas 
of concern. Next, the team is supposed to set up both short-
term and long-term goals. An advocate for the child who 
knows the child well can play a critical role in helping the 
parent or surrogate parent identify the child's strengths and 
areas of improvement and in setting realistic goals that may 
not be apparent to the school personnel. 
Based upon those goals and objectives, the team 
identifies what special education and related services the child 
needs. The IEP must be very specific about the related 
services to be provided, the number of hours per week the 
student is to receive each service, a description of any regular 
education services the student will receive, when the services 
will start and end, and the ways that the child's educational 
progress will be evaluated. Finally, the team identifies an 
appropriate placement. 
The JEP must also include any assistive technology 
services and devices that the students needs and must note 
whether the student needs extended school year services 
(services provided during the summer to students who need 
these services in order to continue to make educational 
progress during the school year). The IEP should also 
indicate whether the child needs any modifications to the 
regular discipline code and whether the child participates in 
regular standardized testing. 
Under the 1997 Jaw, states must develop interagency 
agreements and reimbursement programs to ensure that 
education agencies can access funding from noneducational 
agencies responsible for providing services (such as 
Medicaid) that are also necessary to ensure a free appropriate 
public education. Parents are not required to pay for services 
provided under the IEP (the Free in .EAPE). 
Starting when the child is 14 and updated annually, 
the IEP must include a statement of transition service needs 
of the child. Starting no later then 16, earlier if deemed 
appropriate by the IEP team, the IEP must include transition 
services for the child including, when appropriate, a statement 
of interagency responsibilities or any linkages with other 
agencies, for example, Vocational Rehabilitation or the 
Department of Disabilities and Special Needs. Transition can 
include both work and life skills. Starting at least when the 
child is 17, the child must be informed of his or her 
educational rights which will transfer to the child upon 
reaching age of majority. 
The 1997 law continues the mandate that children 
with disabilities must, to the maximum extent appropriate, be 
educated with nondisabled children. IDEA presumes that 
students with disabilities will be educated in their 
neighborhood schools unless their IEP requires some other 
arrangements. Special classes, a separate school, or removal 
~ 
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of children with disabilities from the regular educational 
environment is to occur only when the nature or severity of 
the child's disability is such that the student's needs cannot be 
met satisfactorily in regular classes even with supplementary 
aids and services. Children with disabilities must be educated 
in the least restrictive environment. 
The parents, guardian and/or surrogate parent are 
key players in the special education process. They have the 
right to examine all records relating to their child. Parents or 
the surrogate parent must be notified in advance of meetings 
and must be given the opportunity to participate in the 
development of the IEP. They can agree or disagree with 
each item separately. This includes what the child's goals 
and objectives should be, what services should be provided 
and the child's placement. They can agree with the goals and 
objectives and with the services that the school has proposed, 
but object because there are additional services that the 
parents feel are needed for the child to benefit from school 
that the school didn't write down. They can agree with the 
services but object to placement. The parents or surrogate 
parents have a great deal of control over the process. 
Part II, to appear next month, will discuss methods 
by which parents or the agency can challenge any aspect of 
special education. 
Recent South Carolina Case 
State v. Evette Pierce, Opinion No. 24613, Heard Oct 31, 
1995- Filed May 12, 1997 
(The State filed a Petition for Rehearing. The Petition for 
Rehearing was denied on June 17, 1997. The Order for 
Remittitur was issued and case sent back to the trial court.) 
Ms. Pierce was convicted of homicide by child abuse 
for the death of her two-year-old son. The Supreme Court in 
a 3-2 split opinion2 reversed the conviction and remanded the 
case. 
The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court 
erred in admitting testimony regarding prior injuries to and 
Ms. Pierce's treatment of the child. At trial, two hospital 
employees testified that one year prior to his death the child 
had been treated for a "split lip" and swollen eye. 
2Justice Moore authored the majority opinion with Chief Justice 
Finney and Justice Waller concurring. Justices Burnett and Toal 
dissented in a separate opinion. 
The majority holds that this testimony was 
improperly admitted under State v. Lyle3, to prove a common 
scheme or plan. That opinion is based on the court's belief 
that there was no "conviction or clear and convincing proof 
that [Ms. Pierce] inflicted the injuries"4 nor was the "prior act 
toward [the child] of such close similarity to homicide by 
child abuse so as to overrule its prejudicial effect."5 
However, the majority opinion goes on to add that, whether 
the evidence of the prior acts of abuse "would have been 
admissible to establish the battered child syndrome is not 
before us." 
The dissent argues that the evide~ce of prior acts of 
abuse was properly admitted as a common scheme or plan 
under State v. Lyle. The dissent would extend the logic of 
State v. Whitener6 and State v. McClellan7 , both sexual abuse 
cases, where testimony regarding sexual abuse "by the same 
perpetrator against the same victim [was held admissible] 
because it showed 'continued illicit intercourse"'8 to child 
physical abuse cases. The dissent contends that Whitener 
and McClellan apply not only to sexual abuse but also child 
physical abuse cases stating that "[ c ]ontinued illicit 
intercourse is analogous to a pattern of child abuse .... " 
At trial Ms. Pierce testified that her son was accident 
prone and his fatal injury was the result of his bumping his 
head on a table. The dissent contends that, in light of the 
defense's claim that the child died as a result of an accident, 
the evidence of the prior injuries would have been admissible 
to negate the defense of mistake or accident under Lyle. The 
dissent also argues that the evidence of the child's prior abuse 
was properly introduced and admitted "to show that [the 
child] was the victim of the battered child syndrome and his 
death was caused not by accident, but by the intentional acts 
of child abuse." 
3State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E.2d 803 (1923) 
4The Court cites State v. Smith, 300 S.C. 216,387 S.E.2d 245 (1989). 
5The test set out in State v. Parker, 315 S.C. 230,233,433 S.E.2d 
831,832 (1993), to determine if the probative value outweighs the 
prejudicial effect is whether "the evidence is of such a close similarity to 
the charged offense that the previous act enhances the probative value of 
the evidence so as to 'overrule the prejudicial effect' .... " If so, the 
evidence of the prior act is admissible. 
6State v. Whitener, 228 S.C. 244, 89 S.E.2d 701(1955). 
7State v. McClellan, 283 S.C. 389, 323 S.E.2d 772 (1984). 
8Citing McClellan, at 392, 774 (emphasis added). 
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Estelle v. McGuire, An Under 
Utilized Resource9 
In State v. Evette Pierce. Opinion No. 24613, heard Oct 
31, 1995- filed May 12, 1997, the South Carolina Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction of a mother for homicide by 
child abuse for the death of her son. The reversal was based 
on the Court's decision that the trial court had improperly 
allowed in evidence as to prior injuries to the child. The 
Court held that the evidence was not properly admitted under 
State v. Lvle, but did hint that a possible way to get the 
evidence in might have been to argue Battered Child 
Syndrome. Following is an outstanding article published in 
Update by the American Prosecutors Research Institutes 's 
National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse that lays out 
how to argue Battered Child Syndrome. 
A six month old girl arrives at the hospital bluish in color 
and not breathing. The doctor notices bruises around the 
infant's ears and a large and recent bruise on her chest 
surrounded by other multiple bruises. The girl dies 45 
minutes later. 
An autopsy reveals numerous contusions to the child's 
chest and abdominal area. Injuries include a split liver, split 
pancreas, lacerated large intestine, damage to a lung, and 
damage to her heart. While these injuries are relatively 
recent, medical personnel also find rectal tearing 
approximately six weeks old and rib fractures approximately 
seven weeks old. Physicians diagnose the child as a victim of 
Battered Child Syndrome. 10 
The child's mother and father brought the baby to the 
hospital. The father tells police he was home with the child 
when the recent injuries occurred and believes the child fell 
from a couch. There is no direct evidence that the rectal 
tearing and rib fractures occurred in the father's exclusive 
care although this remains a possibility. 
The father is charged with the murder of the child. At 
trial, the Court allows prosecutors to admit medical evidence 
that the child's injuries, including the rectal and rib injuries, 
are the product of Battered Child Syndrome. The evidence is 
admitted to show the child's death was not an accident and 
9Update (APRI National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse .) 
v.IO, n.4/5, 1997. 
10The battered-child syndrome is a term used by physicians "to 
characterize a clinical condition in young children who have rece ived 
serious physical abuse." C. Henry Kempe, Frederic N. Silverman, Brandt 
F. Steele, William Droegemueller, and Henry K. Silver, The Battered 
Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17(July7, 1962). 
that the father is the perpetrator. A jury convicts the father of 
the infant's murder. 
This was the fact pattern facing the United States Supreme 
Court in the case of Estelle v. McGuire. 11 The case presented 
the justices with a legal quagmire often found in cases of 
child abuse. 
In order to prove an intentional injury and to establish the 
identity of a perpetrator, prosecutors routinely seek to admit 
all evidence of trauma to the child's body. Often-times, 
prosecutors seek admission of older injuries as a prior bad act 
under the rules of evidence. 12 To admit a prior bad act, 
however, there must be evidence from which jury can 
conclude that the prior act occurred and the accused is 
responsible. 13 
In a case of multiple caretakers, it may be difficult to 
establish that older injuries are the result of conduct from a 
particular suspect. If so, the evidence of prior injuries may be 
inadmissible on the issue of identity.14 
In Estelle. defense counsel contended there was 
insufficient evidence to admit testimony concerning the rectal 
and rib injuries as prior bad acts. In addition, the defendant 
did not contest the child's injuries were intentional. 
Accordingly, defense counsel argued the evidence of prior 
injuries was irrelevant on the issue of whether the trauma was 
intentional. In rejecting these arguments, the Supreme Court 
issued a landmark ruling of benefit to prosecutors 
everywhere. 
Battered child syndrome is admissible to show a child's 
injuries are not accidental 
The Supreme Court noted that in cases of child abuse, a 
prosecutor must first prove that injuries are the result of 
intentional trauma. To the extent evidence of Battered Child 
Syndrome demonstrates intentional trauma, it is relevant and 
11 502U.S. 62, 112S.Ct.475, 116L.Ed2d385(1991). 
12Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to show 
propensity to commit a certain offense but may be admissible for other 
purposes including "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake." Federal Rules of 
Evidence 404(b ). 
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admissible even if the evidence does not establish the identity 
of the perpetrator _IS 
The defendant's apparent concession at trial that the 
child's death was not an accident was insufficient to exclude 
this evidence. The Court observed that "the prosecution's 
burden to prove every element of the crime is not relieved by 
a defendant's tactical decision not to contest an essential 
element of the offense." 16 
Insofar as all eight justices ruling on this issue agree on 
this point, 17 Estelle is a powerful precedent for the 
proposition that a child's prior injuries are relevant even if 
they do not conclusively establish the identity of the abuser. 18 
Battered Child Syndrome May be Admissible to Establish 
Identity 
Estelle also contains helpful language of use to 
prosecutors seeking to admit evidence of prior injuries as a 
means of proving the identity of the perpetrator. 
All eight justices agreed there was sufficient evidence 
upon which a jury could fmd that the father committed the 
prior rib and rectal injuries. 19 Accordingly, a jury could use 
these prior injuries to establish the identity of the father as the 
person responsible for the child's murder. 20 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the mere 
diagnosis of Battered Child Syndrome limits the suspects to 
the child's immediate caretakers. The Court found that 
"( o )nly someone regularly 'caring' for the child has the 
continuing opportunity to inflict these types of injuries; an 
15 112 S.Ct. 480. 
16 112 S.Ct. 481. 
17Justice Thomas did not participate in the decision. Justices 
O'Connor and Stevens joined the court's holding that battered child 
syndrome is relevant to establish intentional trauma. However, O'Connor 
and Stevens dissented from the court's ruling that the trial court's jury 
instructions did not violate due process. 
18For additional discussion on the importance of Estelle, see Darin 
Michael Colussi, Comment, Evidence- Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S.Ct. 474 
(1991), 26 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1213 (1992); Tammara K. Poage, 
Comment, Constitutional Law: Battered Child Syndrome: Balancing an 
Accused's Right to Due Process with the Evidentiary Problems Inherent 
in Child Abuse Cases , 32 Washburn L.J. 118 (1992). 
19 112 S.Ct. 483, 486. 
20 112 S.Ct. 483. 
isolated contact with a vicious stranger would not result in 
this pattern of successive injuries through several months. "21 
As further evidence that the father was responsible for the 
prior injuries, the Court cited the testimony of a neighbor who 
witnessed the father treat the child roughly on two occasions. 
The Court also cited evidence that at the hospital the mother 
pressed the father to reveal the true nature of the child's 
injuries.22 At trial, the mother testified that she was 
responsible for the child's murder. 23 
Since the evidence of the father roughly treating the child 
did not directly relate to the rectal and rib injuries, and the 
mother's statements at the hospital likewise did not directly 
address the older injuries, it is apparent that the diagnosis of 
Battered Child Syndrome was the primary basis upon which 
the Court found the prior injuries to be relevant on the issue 
of identity. 
If this is true, prosecutors dealing with cases containing 
this diagnosis cannot only admit the evidence to show an 
intentional trauma, the evidence may be admissible to prove 
identity even in the absence of direct evidence connecting the 
accused to the prior injuries. If it can be affirmatively shown 
that the accused was not present when prior injuries were 
inflicted, the evidence likely remains relevant as exculpatory 
evidence. 
Although all eight justices agreed there was sufficient 
evidence upon which a jury could find the father responsible 
for the prior injuries and to use this as a factor in determining 
his guilt for the murder, Justices O'Connor and Stevens 
dissented from the majority opinion on the basis the trial 
court's jury instructions were so poorly written that the jury 
may have believed the court already determined the father to 
have inflicted the prior injuries. 
Although the majority opinion disagrees with the dis-
senters' reading of the jury instructions, prosecutors should 
exercise care to avoid instructions which invade the province 
of the trier of fact. Jury instructions which unambiguously 
leave to the jury the decision of determining the perpetrator 
of the prior injuries and the causal connection of those 
injuries to the present circumstances will likely withstand any 
claimed violation of the due process clause. 
21 112 S.Ct. 483 citing People v. Jackson, 18 Cai.App.3d at 507, 95 
Cal. Rptr. at 921. 
22 112 S.Ct. 483. 
23 112 S.Ct. 479. 
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Adoption Promotion Act of 1997 
The United States Congress is considering Senate Bill 827 
and House Bill 867 which would amend the reasonable 
efforts provision and grant incentives to states to promote 
adoption. HR 867 has passed the House of Representatives 
and was read for the second time in Senate. Senate 827 is the 
corresponding "Adoption Promotion Act of 1997" for the 
Senate. 
HR 867 would amend 42 U.S.C. 671 (a)(l5) to identify 
situations in which reasonable efforts would not required. 
The amendment provides that reasonable efforts are not 
necessary if (1) reasonable efforts are inconsistent with the 
permanent plan for the child; (2) the child has been subjected 
to aggravated circumstances of abuse; or (3) the parent's 
parental rights to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily. 
In determining reasonable efforts the child's health and safety 
shall be of paramount concern. Efforts must be made to place 
the child for adoption or in a permanent home if the 
circumstances fit one of the three above referenced 
exceptions to reasonable efforts requirement. 
The bill would amend 42 U.S.C. 675(5) so that a 
termination of parental rights action can be filed for a child 
under the age of 10 years if the child has been in foster care 
for 18 out of the last 24 months. A termination of parental 
rights action is not required if: 
• the child is in relative placement; 
• state court or agency has held it is not in the best interest 
of the minor child to terminate the parents' rights; or 
• the state has not provided to the family appropriate 
services when reasonable efforts are required to be made. 
This amendment would be applicable to children who 
enter foster care on or about October 1, 1997. 
The states may receive grants as an incentive to increase 
the number adoptions of children from foster care and of 
special needs children. 
The bill would amend 42 U.S.C. 675(5)(c) by providing 
that a permanency planning hearing must be held within 12 
months of the child entering foster care, as opposed to 18 
months. A permanent plan must be developed for the child 
which includes decisions on whether the child can be returned 
to the parent, whether the agency should file a petition to 
terminate parental rights and pursue adoption, whether legal 
guardianship or other permanent living arrangements, 
including relative placement, can be established for the child. 
Foster parents or any relatives providing care for the child 
are entitled to notice of the permanency planning hearing and 
must be given an opportunity to be heard. However, foster 
parents or the relatives are not considered parties to the 
action. 
Under this bill, the state agency must develop a plan and 
specific steps to be taken to fmd an adoptive family or other 
permanent living arrangement for the child. Permanent living 
arrangements can include an adoptive family, a legal 
guardian, or relative placement. Documentation of an 
adoption or legal guardianship shall include the use of child 
specific recruitment efforts. 
1ft~ is bill is adopted, an advisory panel must be developed 
to review and make recommendations on kinship care. The 
Secretary of Health and Human Services would have until 
March I, 1998 to convene the panel. The panel would have 
to submit a report to the House Ways and Means Committee 
and the Senate Finance Committee by November 1, 1998. 
The report would include the following information: 
• states policies regarding kinship care 
• characteristics of the kinship providers (race, age, etc.) 
• number of persons in the household 
• the parent's access to the child while in kinship care 
• a source of funds for kinship care 
• permanency planning goals for the child 
• services provided to the parent 
• services provided to the kinship provider 
• circumstances or conditions that resulted in kinship 
placement. 
The states will be required to develop laws and procedures 
that w_ould allow a critically ill parent to designate a standby 
guardian for the minor child. The parent would not lose their 
parental rights. The standby guardian's duty would take effect 
upon: 
• the death of the parent; 
• mental incapacity of the parent; 
• physical incapacity of the parent with the parent's 
consent. 
Case Decisions From Around 
The Nation 
Admission of Expert Medical Testimony 
The Defendant in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. 
!ohnson, 690 A. 2d 274 (Pa. Super. 1997), was charged with 
mvoluntary deviant sexual intercourse, attempted involuntary 
deviant sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent assault, 
indecent exposure and corruption of minors. The defendant 
attempted to exclude the doctor's testimony. The doctor 
would have testified that absence of evidence of physical 
trauma was not inconsistent with allegations of sexual assault. 
.. 
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The lower court granted the defendant's motion in limine to 
exclude the evidence. The Superior Court for Pennsylvania 
ruled that the doctor's testimony is admissible as evidence 
and therefore reversed the lower court's decision. 
The defendant argued that the doctor's testimony would 
improperly bolster the child's credibility and the testimony 
of the presence or absence of physical evidence is 
inadmissible in child sexual abuse cases. 
The Pennsylvania courts have previously made a 
distinction between expert testimony regarding physical facts 
and testimony regarding the behavior of victims. An expert 
witness' testimony regarding the physical condition of the 
child does not bolster the child's creditability and is useful 
information for the jury. However, an expert witness' 
testimony of whether a child's conduct or behavior is 
consistent with sexual abuse is assuming the jury's role in 
evaluating the witness. The court upheld the admissibility of 
the pediatrician's testimony that the absence of physical 
injuries or scars is common and does not exclude sexual 
abuse. 
Child Requests Domestic Violence Protection Order 
Against Father 
In Beermann v. Beermann, 559 N.W. 2d 868 (S.D. 1997), 
the minor child requested a temporary protection order 
restraining her father from abusing her during visitations. 
The 14-year-old child argued with her father during a 
visitation. The defendant picked his daughter up, dropped 
her, picked her again and threw her in a chair. The defendant 
was verbally abusive toward his daughter. 
The trial court denied the protection order. The lower 
court held that the domestic violence statute did not apply to 
children, only adults. The petitioner requested a Writ of 
Mandamus from the South Dakota Supreme Court. The state 
supreme court granted an alternative Writ of Mandamus, 
ordering the lower court to issue a temporary restraining 
order and to conduct a hearing on the entire matter. After the 
hearing the lower court again ruled that the domestic violence 
statute did not apply to children. The court ruled the 
petitioner could not maintain the action due to her age. The 
court ruled that the petitioner had other options such as the 
mother requesting a modification in the visitation schedule 
and protection under the "Protection of Children from Abuse 
or Neglect" act. The court also ruled that evidence was not 
sufficient to establish the abuse. 
The South Dakota domestic violence statute provides that 
" a petition may be made by any family or household member 
against any other family or household member." The 
supreme court held that the statute is not limited to adult 
family or household members. Additionally, the term family 
or household member is clearly defmed as "spouses, former 
spouses or persons related by consanguinity, adoption or law, 
persons living in the same household, persons who have 
children." 
The supreme court ruled that the trial court had the option 
of appointing a guardian ad litem to protect the interest of the 
minor child as opposed to dismissing her action. The 
supreme court ruled that a custodial parent may choose not to 
pursue a modification of visitation action or may be unable to 
afford the cost of a modification of a visitation action. Under 
the domestic violence provisions, a victim can complete the 
preprinted forms without the assistance of counsel and the 
relief requested may be granted sooner. The supreme court 
noted that the petitioner was not requesting a modification of 
the visitation only that the defendant is restrained and 
enjoined from abusing her during the visitation. 
Note: 
Advocates should note that the South Carolina statute on 
Protection from Domestic Abuse defines "household 
member" as a spouse, former spouse, parents or children, and 
other persons related by consanguinity or affinity within the 
second degree, persons who have a child in common, and a 
male and female who are cohabiting or formerly were 
cohabiting (§20-4-20). Any household member in need of 
protection or any household member on behalf of the children 
may file the petition for protection against abuse (§20-4-40). 
Therefore a child who is abused by a household member is 
entitled to protection under the "Protection from Domestic 
Abuse Act". 
Position Announcement 
The Children's Law Project is seeking a Resource 
Attorney to provide technical assistance, conduct training, 
and prepare legal resource materials primarily related to 
criminal child abuse cases. This grant-funded position is full-
time and includes state benefits. Requirements are: law 
degree; membership in S.C. Bar; and a minimum of three-
years' experience in criminal child abuse cases. Experience 
in family court child protection cases would be a plus. 
Columbia residents apply through the USC Employment 
Office, 508 Assembly St., 9-11AM or 1-3 PM Mon.- Thurs. 
Others may send resumes to the Children's Law Project. 
The Children's Law Report is a monthly publication of the Children's Law 
Project. Items may be reprinted if attributed to the Children's Law Report. 
Please send copies of any material containing reprints to the Children's Law 
Project. The Children's Law Project is a strategy of SC Families for Kids 
and also supported through the Children's Justice Act Task Force. It is 
administered by the USC School of Law in partnership with the Institute for 
Families in Society. 
Phone (803) 777-1646 Fax (803) 777-8686 
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I. Overall format of newsletter, including attractiveness and readability: __ _ 
2. Quality of articles: __ _ 
3. Variety of items: __ _ 
4. Length of newsletter: (Circle one) Too short About right Too long 
4. Most useful areas: (Circle one) Case decisions Updates of law Articles on legal issues 
Articles on social science issues 
5. Please note any other topic areas or issues that you would like addressed: _______________ _ 
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